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Abstract 
This article critically examines the literature dealing with the British Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations (2004). It is argued that notwithstanding 
significant academic interest, the implications of the legislation for employees, trade unions 
and managers remain under explored and inadequately theorised. Outlining the principal 
deficiencies it suggests scholars could derive much inspiration from the voluminous output 
relating to both the (sister) European Works Council (EWC) directive and the continental 
works council format. The absence of research dealing with the interconnectedness of the 
ICE and EWC Regulations is similarly highlighted. It is suggested that researchers might 
usefully import the concept of ‘institutional complementarity’ to extend knowledge of the 
synergies potentially derived from the operation of both pan-European (EWC) and national 
(ICE) fora in those organisations where such bodies co-exist.  
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Skating on thin ICE?  A critical evaluation of a decade of research on the British 
Information and Consultation Regulations (2004) 
Butler, P., Gunnigle, P., Lavelle, J., & O’Sullivan, M. 
Introduction  
The demise of ‘voluntarism’ – once a core principle of British industrial relations –  has been 
well documented (cf. e.g. Dickens and Hall, 2006). An important component of this dynamic 
has been the growth of legally based ‘mandated’ rights to workplace information and 
consultation (I&C) driven by the European Union’s (EU) social agenda.  The  European 
Works Council (EWC) and national level Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) 
Regulations afford employees with significant rights to information and dialogue on 
economic, employment and strategic issues. Significantly, 2014 marks the tenth anniversary 
of the transposition of the ICE regulations into UK law. Such coincidences naturally incline 
stakeholders to draw up evaluations and critiques (see Jagodzinski, 2011: 204)   
 
Whilst an immense academic literature now surrounds the EWC directive, scrutiny of the ICE 
regulations has been far less exacting. As Dundon et al. (2014:26) note, ‘the impact of the 
transposed I&C Directive on employer decision-making powers remains an important and 
neglected issue’. As a result our empirical and theoretical knowledge of this area is 
significantly under developed when compared to the EWC directive at a corresponding stage 
of its evolution and development. As such, the potential costs and benefits of the regulations 
for the principal stakeholder groups – employees, trade unions and managers, remain largely 
uncharted.  Still more elusive is research identifying the structural conditions (e.g. technology 
and product markets) that might underpin meaningful consultation. The relatively low level 
of attention paid to the ICE provisions is surprising given that the directive applies to 
significantly more British workplaces than its EWC counterpart.  Taking these observations 
as a starting point we argue the need for a greater degree of empirical and theoretical vitality. 
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In an attempt to inject some much needed theoretical momentum the first part of the 
commentary highlights those areas where analyses of ICE stakeholder outcomes could 
usefully borrow from the theoretical maturity of both the sister EWC Regulations and the 
continental works council format, significantly; the Germanic system of codetermination.  
 
The second half of the article sets out the need for a more holistic research agenda. In recent 
years parallel, yet wholly discrete streams of EWC (e.g. Waddington 2011a; 2011b and 
Timming, 2007) and ICE (e.g. Dundon et al. 2014; Koukiadaki, 2010; Taylor, 2009) research 
have emerged.  One important corollary is the absence of data dealing with the institutional 
interplay of pan European (EWC) and national (ICE) channels of interest representation; 
specifically, consideration of the various interrelationships e.g. the potential for the  cross 
fertilisation of strategy, ideas and practice. We argue this empirical dualism is untenable, not 
least because the twin instruments are viewed by the European Commission as 
complementary components of the European social agenda – improvement of living and 
working conditions, development of human resources and dialogue with the social partners 
etc. We contend the need for a research strategy that treats ‘mandated consultation’ as an 
expansive phenomenon – an interlocking ‘regulatory space’ (Dundon et al. 2014) – with 
potentially mutually reinforcing components.  Drawing on institutional theory it is suggested  
researchers could usefully import the concept of ‘institutional complementarity’ as a 
theoretical lens to facilitate a deeper understanding of the ICE (and EWC)  regulations. 
Likewise, the potential contribution of a comparative international dimension to ICE research 
is outlined.  Before considering such matters the material commences with a brief overview 
of the directives.  
 
The regulations 
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The implementation of the EWC (1994) and ICE (2002) directives represented the realisation 
of the European Commission’s long standing ambition to afford workers with codified rights 
to organisational participation. The European Works Council directive, transposed into UK 
law in 1998, following New Labour’s adoption of the Maastricht Treaty was aimed at 
securing information and consultation rights for employees in ‘community scale’ 
undertakings i.e.  MNCs with at least 1,000 employees and 150 or more in at least two 
member states.  The regulations were seen as a corrective to the creation of the single 
European market (SEM) in 1987 (Waddington, 2011b: 2) which provided significant 
possibilities for the international restructuring of operations and the potential for job cuts and 
social dislocation but afforded no opportunity for employees to influence such decisions 
(Redfern, 2007: 292). This was an especially significant development for organisations with 
headquarters in the UK and the Republic of Ireland where one legacy of ‘voluntarism’ was 
the absence of a statutory system of information and consultation (I&C)  through works 
council arrangements (see Marginson et al. 2004: 209). The terms of reference of the EWC 
Regulations include the right to be informed and consulted about transnational decisions 
including business prospects, employment trends and restructuring initiatives (Marginson et 
al 2004: 210) as well as investments and the introduction of new working methods and 
collective redundancies (Eurofound, 2000). 
 
The Information and Consultation directive provides analogous national level rights to I&C 
for employees in undertakings of 50 or more workers. The directive thus requires employers 
to  inform and consult employees or their representatives about employment prospects and 
decisions likely to result in substantial change to work organisation or contractual relations, 
including decisions covered by the legislation on collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings (Eurofound, 2009). Mirroring the EWC Regulations, consultation is concerned 
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with the exchange of views but stops short of bargaining, the responsibility for decision 
making hence remains with management (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007).     
 
Both directives are examples of reflexive or ‘soft’ law (O’Hagan, 2005:389) and as such 
impose a fairly modest set of minimum standards (Waddington, 2011b: 2). Organisations are 
afforded significant flexibility in terms of their strategies of response. There is, for example, 
no outright obligation on companies to establish I&C arrangements at the two institutional 
levels - the process has to be ‘triggered’ by the managers, employees or their representatives. 
Where the process is initiated by either of the latter two minimum thresholds of support 
apply.  In the discussion that follows we seek to systematically evaluate the stock of 
knowledge regarding the implications of the ICE directive for workers, trade unions and 
managers. Given the technical similarities EWC output is used as a benchmark to assess the 
extant  theoretical and empirical limitations of the ICE literature.  
 
 
ICE: Stakeholder outcomes   
  
Employee influence  
While the theme of organisational democracy has been significantly explored within the 
EWC literature (e.g. Wills, 1998; Stirling and Fitzgerald, 2000) any similar evaluation of the  
ICE Regulations has been far less exacting.  A detailed overview of the now voluminous 
EWC literature is beyond the scope of this article (see here Jagodinski, 2011) but at a general 
level of analysis it is possible to track an evolving sophistication within the field.  Early 
accounts of EWC procedures noted they tended to be management led with restrictions 
placed on the consultative apparatus (e.g. Wills 1998).  A more subtle tranche of inputs (e.g. 
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Quintana Fernandez, 2003) highlighted the potential for ‘institutional conversion’ (Streeck 
and Thelan, 2005), suggesting these ostensibly pluralist structures were prone to be 
‘captured’ (Muller and Hoffman, 2001:86) i.e. reconfigured along unitary lines for the 
furtherance of aspects of HR policy e.g. the promotion of commitment and awareness of 
corporate culture.  Developing the theme of intentional managerial strategising commentators 
highlighted  a more explicitly ‘Machiavellian’ (Timming, 2007: 251) approach where EWCs 
were utilised as a mode of labour control via a strategy of  ‘proactive fragmentation’ 
(Timming, 2007: 251)  encouraging divisiveness  and competition  between international 
plants (see Tuckman and Whitall, 2002).  More theoretically ambitious comparative  studies  
drew on comparative institutionalism to relate variations in practice (e.g. restrictive 
managerial attitudes) to contextual variables including inter alia country of origin 
(Marginson et al 2013), country of location (Marginson et al 2004: Hall et al. 2003) and 
structural company specific considerations (see Redfern, 2007: 29). 
 
Our knowledge of the workings of the ICE Regulations is more restricted.  There was much 
early conjecture on the implications for voice and the likely employer response. Gollan and 
Wilkinson (2007: 11) suggested the implementation of the directive had the potential, at least, 
to ‘transform the UK industrial relations environment’.  Hall (2005: 122) extrapolating from 
the EWC experience, speculated a more realistic outcome was ‘legislatively prompted 
voluntarism’; that is, the spread of organisationally specific I&C arrangements leaving 
systems of governance largely intact.  Recent years have witnessed the emergence of more 
empirically based accounts that have usefully served to move debate beyond supposition. 
Thus, Hall et al’s (2011; see also Hall and Purcell 2012) broad conclusion, based on an 
analysis of consultation in twenty five organisations, is the directive has had only ‘limited 
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significance’ (p. 22). Such sentiments are echoed in other comparative case study research 
(see e.g. Cullinane et al. 2013: Dundon et al. 2014; Koukiadaki, 2010 and Taylor et al. 2009).  
 
Useful as the emergent data are an important challenge facing researchers remains the 
development of (a) typologies that might further the systematic categorisation of ICE 
structures vis-à-vis the efficacy of voice, particularly important in comparative work, and (b) 
the creation of analytically exacting models that might explain differences in functionality 
and outcome.  
 
The most empirically encompassing research to date is the study undertaken by Hall and 
colleagues (Hall et al. 2011; Hall and Purcell, 2012: 137-159). This ambitious work tracks the 
four year (2006-10) evolution of consultation under the regulations in a variety of sectors. 
The study provides much useful information locating the establishment of ICE arrangements 
within their economic and business context. A classificatory distinction is drawn between 
‘active consulters’, ‘communicators’ and ‘defunct bodies’ (p.10). Eight of the fora are 
categorised within the former category with I&C occurring on strategic, business and 
organisational issues.   Hall et al’s three fold typology has the virtue of a broad empirical base 
and represents a useful point of entry.  However, the overly capacious ‘activist’ classification 
requires further disaggregation.  One prerequisite for an ‘active’ classification is the exertion 
of ‘a degree of influence over outcomes’ (p. 10, emphasis added) –– a potentially expansive 
gateway.   Accordingly, the ‘scope’ of competence is deemed by the managerial respondents 
to range from ‘effectively negotiation’ in one organisation (Hall and Purcell, 2012:139) 
through to ‘dialogue, not decision making’ (Hall and Purcell, 2012:146) in another (emphasis 
added). As such no distinction is drawn between satisfactory consultation and what Lecher et 
al. (2001:48; see below) term ‘consultation plus’. Similarly, in terms of the gravity of 
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discussions, in some organisations this extends to strategic issues which lie at the very outer 
reaches of the ‘range’ of issues that could be affected  (e.g. decisions on restructuring and 
redundancies) while in other cases it is seemingly restricted to operational matters and HR 
policy e.g. pay and staff benefits (Hall et al. 2011: 11). As such a broad range of experiences 
and outcomes are compressed into a single categorisation.  
 
A more theoretically exacting contribution is the work of Dundon et al. (2014). Drawing on 
Luke’s (1974) multiple faces of power model it is demonstrated how both employers and the 
state shaped the transposition of the directive to reinforce a preference for voluntarism (p. 
34). Macro level analysis of government documents is intelligently linked to micro level case 
study data to demonstrate how employers in the three case studies were able to dominate the 
new ‘regulatory space’ imposing a weak form of  consultation. Power similarly figures in 
Cullinane et al’s. (2013) case study analysis of three non union systems of employee 
representation (NER) revamped under the ICE provisions. The I&C Regulations are seen to 
do little to enhance the ‘latent power’ resources of the fora,  an outcome manifest in an 
absence of substantial employee  gains.    An interesting issue however is whether such 
outcomes are inevitable in all situations. As Cullinane et al. (2013: 828) observe with respect 
to two of their case study organisations, ‘unitary anti-unionism was hardly propitious for the 
emergence of non-union partnership: the potential for mutual gains might have been different 
in a more receptive managerial climate…’.    Certainly, structures do exert pressures and 
constraints imposing path dependencies which will shape the power resources of the relevant 
actors.  Nonetheless, there is still scope for purposive managerial action and it is far from 
inconceivable – especially given the potential linkages to corporate efficiency  – (see below)  
that ICE could be operationalized  in a subtle and sensitive way to afford workers with 
‘option based’ (Sisson cited in Dundon et al. 2014: 24) or  meaningful consultation. 
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Knowledge of the  factors that could potentially drive the latter scenario remains significantly 
underdeveloped.  
   
Given the longer period of gestation EWC modelling is inevitably more refined. The work of 
Lecher et al. (1999) is regarded as seminal in being the first framework for the analysis of  
EWCs that considers how a  variety of internal and external factors impinge on their 
development and success.  A four-fold classification is derived from the interplay of four 
‘fields of interaction’: (i) amongst EWC members, (ii) between EWC and management, (iii) 
EWC vis-a-vis trade unions, (iv) EWC vis-a-vis existing national employee representative 
institutions. The four idealised EWC structure delineated range from ‘symbolic’ EWCs, 
which merely exist on paper, through to ‘participative’ EWCs that are autonomous of 
management and seek to articulate employee interests through both consultation and 
negotiation (Lecher et al 2001: 57). Significantly, the modelling has a dynamic component, 
these categories are deemed to capture different stages of EWC development.   
 
Koukiadaki’s (2010) multiple case study research draws on Lecher’s modelling to identify 
four types of ICE structures, symbolic, participative, pragmatic and dynamic. While the 
former two are directly transposed from Lecher, the distinction drawn between the 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘dynamic’ categories requires conceptual refinement. The former are deemed 
to provide ‘average’ information’, while the latter are designated ‘satisfactory’ in this respect. 
Given one is an objective assessment, the other a normative judgement, the precise contrast to 
be drawn is somewhat amorphous.  Similarly, in terms of nomenclature, does ‘pragmatic’ 
refer to managerial strategy vis-à-vis legal compliance, attitudes towards trade unions or 
both?   Such issues are not directly confronted.     
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The modelling of ICE structures clearly remains ‘work in progress’. Scholars might do well 
to look to the German works council prototype for inspiration where Kotthoff (1994) was the 
first to develop a sociologically robust typology capturing gradations of effectiveness based 
on a large data set - sixty three case studies in six industries. This resultant modelling, 
followed by amended typologies (see Frege, 2002:226), was based on a range of actor 
focussed variables including  management perceptions of the function of the works council, 
works councillors’ perception of their role and communication between management and 
works council. This approach yields seven ideal types of works council. Interestingly, no less 
than four of these potentially map onto Hall et al’s (2011; see also Hall and Purcell, 2012) 
expansive ‘active consulters’ categorisation (see Figure 1 below) highlighting the need here 
for the further refinement of British modelling.  
 
Take in Figure 1 about here   (p. 33) 
 
This bespoke model of course reflects the strong powers imposed on German Works councils 
under the codeterminations laws and the maturity of the institutions. The challenge facing UK 
researchers is the development of a correspondingly discriminating bespoke categorisation 
which might similarly explain how structural factors and social relations influence the 
efficacy of the voice process under the ICE Regulations. Mirroring Lecher et al’s (Lecher et 
al. 1999: Lecher et al. 2001) EWC research, an evolutionary dimension cataloguing different 
stages of development and maturity would be a welcome addition. 
 
The trade union dimension - beyond the ‘Trojan Horse’ hypothesis 
As Brewster et al. (2007: 69) note, ‘changes in regulatory forms open up both challenges and 
opportunities’. Accordingly, consideration of the potential implications of mandated 
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consultation for trade unions received much speculation. Certainly the EWC Regulations 
attracted significant comment vis-a-vis the pan European implications for organised labour. 
British industrial relations scholars have similarly enjoyed the opportunities for conjecture 
afforded by the ICE directive. Turning firstly to EWCs, Banyulus et al. (2008: 532) have 
usefully highlighted the nub of the issue, referring  to the ‘tensions of micro corporatism 
caught between inter-national solidarity and regime competition’.  At an optimistic level it is 
suggested EWCs hold out the potential for ‘horizontal integration’ i.e.  cross national  
collaboration of the labour movement. From this perspective EWCs are viewed a potential 
precursors for innovative modes of workplace solidarity, European level collective 
bargaining, and by inference, trade union renewal (Taylor and Mathers, cited in Banyuls 
2008:534).  A more pessimistic interpretation, highly prominent within the early literature, 
cautioned  representatives  might become parochial defenders of national interests (Schulten,  
cited in Weston and Martinez Lucio 1998), engaging in ‘productivity coalitions’ with local 
management, actually undermining labour solidarity.  
 
This important theoretical dichotomy remains under explored. Certainly it is well accepted 
that EWCs have not acted as engines for pan European collective bargaining and that trade 
unions in general have been unable to define a clear strategy for EWCs (Hann, 2010). There 
is some evidence of management utilising EWCs as a mode of  ‘proactive fragmentation’ 
(Timming,  2007: 251) to disorientate and disunite representatives  (Timming,  2007). 
Equally, there is evidence, albeit limited, (e.g. Banyuls et al. 2008) of EWCs being used to 
attenuate the consequences of regime competition with international delegates acting in 
unison with a sense of international solidarity.  The antecedent factors that might underpin 
the emergence of these very differing scenarios have not been significantly explored.  
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Consideration of the opportunities and challenges posed to trade unions by the ICE 
Regulations similarly received much initial speculation (see e.g. Gollan and Wilkinson, 
2007:1153-1155).    There are early references to unions adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach 
(Doherty, 2008: 616) but little evidence of an evolving strategy. Mirroring early EWC output, 
interpretations of the consequences for trade unions had a tendency towards polarisation. One 
early proposition was the ICE provisions might enable trade unions to mount a recovery (see 
Storey, 2005: 14) – the ‘Trojan Horse’ (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007: 1154) hypothesis. 
Simply put, unions open up a second front actively colonising the consultative apparatus in 
non-union and partially unionised  organisations, and is so doing, demonstrate the value of 
independent representation. The alternative prognosis is that of trade union ‘marginalisation’. 
Under this interpretation the provisions are used to ‘dilute’ (Storey, 2005: 14) union influence 
where it exists e.g. into a dual channel format or to dissipate potential recognition drives 
(Storey, 2005: 14). 
 
Hitherto the salience of these competing predictions has received scant empirical scrutiny. 
Hall et al’s (2011) aforementioned analysis of the operation of ICE in twenty five 
organisations - fourteen of which were unionised - points to unions reacting ‘cautiously’ with 
limited evidence of colonisation (Hall et al. 2011: 21). Equally, in Cullinane’s  et al’s 
(2014:828) study of Britco the union was ‘disinterested in utilising the potentials afforded’ by 
the ICE legislation.  In terms of managerial strategy Koukiadaki’s (2010) study in five 
financial and business service companies indicates a fairly neutral, if unsupportive 
managerial approach to union involvement. In two of the organisations the ICE structures 
were developed ‘indirectly’ to ‘discourage’ employee commitment to union based 
arrangements (Koukiadaki, 2010: 19;  see also Dundon et al 2014: 31-32), while one union 
was able nonetheless to utilise the structure for intelligence and to expand the remit of 
13 
 
consultation. Taylor et al’s (2009) research does point strongly, however, towards 
marginalisation with consultative arrangements over redundancies being used to constrain 
union ability to contest restructuring.  
 
The theme of union strategy requires careful, multi-layered consideration. Dundon et al. 
(2014) touch on this theme concluding the ambivalence of national union officials towards 
the ICE directive has aided the ability of employers to occupy and dominate this space. It is 
important nonetheless not to ascribe strategic intent solely to full time officials (FTOs).   It 
has long been accepted that the FTO-lay activist interface constitutes a fundamental cleavage 
within the trade  union movement (see Heery and Kelly, 1990: 76).  Inertia at national (FTO) 
level need not preclude a more inspired local response from lay activists,  especially those 
eager to extend their own jurisdictional claims –– voice is a political and contested process, 
no less in intra union terms. A full contextual understanding is again necessary.  
 
‘Serving different masters’ ––  managerial  considerations  
The principal purpose of mandated consultation is to provide institutional adjustments that 
will afford employee representatives with influence over decision making, – equity and 
industrial democracy considerations dominate evaluations of effectiveness. The European 
Commission however has long championed employee voice as a component of organisational 
efficiency. As the Commission noted in 1998, ‘Information and Consultation are factors for 
productivity as they contribute to the creation of a highly skilled and committed workforce 
(CEC, 1998: 2).  As such there is a need to redefine ‘effectiveness’ beyond employee 
interests and the democratisation of the workplace and consider the implications of mandated 
consultation for the managerial and practitioner constituency.  Certainly, within the UK, the 
legitimising rhetoric surrounding the transposition of the ICE Regulations in 2004  was 
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couched in terms of the latter ‘business case’ (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007: 1148) narrative. 
Indeed, the regulation of consultation was a core component of New Labour’s Third Way 
discourse on the compatibility of workplace fairness and economic efficiency (see Tucker, 
2010:112 and 120).  
 
The ‘black box’ issue of precisely how consultation might enhance corporate  efficiency and 
serve a ‘market creating’ (Tucker, 2010: 121) function is typically ill specified. According to 
Storey (2005:3) the path to ‘high performance’ is to be steered by ‘high commitment’ and 
this in turn requires an informed, knowledgeable and fully consulted workforce.  Approached 
from the perspective of HRM, mandated structures of consultation thus represent new 
platforms for communication (Muller and Hoffman, 2001: 92),  the study of which dovetails  
into important HR issues including empowerment, employee involvement and the promotion 
of  organisational culture (Muller and Hoffman, 2001: 92). 
 
The relationship between consultative voice and corporate efficiency is a well-trodden theme 
within the German works council literature (e.g. Frege 2002: 234-236).  Simply put, the 
principal justification for voice rests on the argument that communication fosters trust 
because employee representatives are able to judge whether the information from the 
managerial team is reliable (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). This may in turn serve an important 
legitimising function e.g. during the introduction of new technology, reducing resistance to 
change (Frege, 2002:236) enhancing discretionary effort.  The reduction of information 
asymmetries invoked by micro-corporatist arrangements gives rise furthermore to more 
informed decision making, fostering new and better solutions (Frege, 2002:235). The impact 
of German works councils on a range of performance indicators e.g. profit, capital 
investment, product innovation and ‘quit rates’  has been subject to a fair degree of  
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econometric assessment (for a summary see Frege, 2002: 236-240) the results of which are 
however largely equivocal (Frege 2002:239).  
 
Normatively speaking EWC and ICE institutions are more propitious contexts for ‘optimistic 
pluralism’ (Tucker 2010).  As Frege (2002: 239) reminds us, [German] works councils were 
never introduced to enhance the performance of the firm. A comparable strand of 
econometric research exploring the impact of  ICE (and indeed EWC) structures on 
organisational efficiency has nonetheless failed to emerge. As such it is not known if the 
consolidation of existing power asymmetries has implications for efficiency as well as equity.  
Returning to the German works council experience, Frege (2002: 239) has argued there is a 
need to blend sociological insights into economic analysis –– this applies no less to ICE (and 
EWC) structures.  
 
To summarise the argument thus far, ICE research remains significantly underdeveloped.  
There has been some consideration of the implications for employee voice but the overall 
limitations of this line of research are reflected in the unambitious and inexact nature of the 
typologies abstracted.  Our knowledge of the implications for the other stakeholders is, if 
anything, more impoverished. As indicated, ICE scholars can draw much inspiration from the 
theoretical platform provided by the greater maturity of European and national works council 
research and we have sought to delineate some potentially fruitful avenues of investigation. 
More broadly, it is essential that the research community takes a more holistic 
methodological approach and considers (a) the synergies and complementarities that exist 
between the two (EWC and ICE) modes of regulation, and (b); the potential contribution of 
international comparative research.  These lines of argument are developed below. 
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 Opportunities for theory building 
 
(a) ICE and institutional complementarity  
Scholars seeking to probe the EWC-ICE nexus might do well to look to elements of 
contemporary institutional theory for theoretical insight. The theme of ‘institutional 
complementarity’, famously explored within the field of comparative political economy (e.g. 
Hall and Soskice, 2001) has been overlooked by ICE (and EWC) analysts. This is surprising 
given reference to the EU polity’s multi-level governance system as a ‘jigsaw’, the potential 
impact of one element of which cannot be assessed properly without linking it to the other 
pieces making up the whole (see Jagodzinski et al. 2007: 1-2). The phenomenon of 
institutional complementarity occurs when the functional performance of an institution is 
conditioned by the presence  of another and vice versa (Höpner, 2005:383). It is especially 
pertinent to the theme of European regulation given this is ‘composed of several 
interconnected elements’ (Jagodzinski et al. 2007:11).  
   
A number of opportunities for theory building follow. The literature recognises the need for 
EWCs to establish links with other institutions (e.g. Lecher et al, 1999: 81-82) as a precursor 
for effective representation.  Lecher et al. (1999:3) thus refer to the ‘critical link’ between 
EWCs and ‘national structures of interest representation. The necessity for networking and 
capacity building is similarly a requirement the European Commission has long been 
sensitive to:  
 
In order to exchange information and be consulted effectively at Community level, it is 
necessary for efficient information and consultation systems to exist at national level and 
for the different levels of worker representation within undertakings or groups of 
undertakings to be linked with each other (Commission of the European Communities 
cited in O’Hagan, 2004: 399). 
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Articulation between the European and national level is less problematic (see Lecher et al 
1999:225-228) within countries where complementary national works council channels of 
representation operate (e.g. German works councils and the French comité  d’enterprise). 
However, within a predominantly non union systems of industrial relations, such as the UK, 
where there is no tradition of regulated employee representation, there may well be an 
‘institutional gap’ (Hall et al. 2003). One corollary is the potential for EWCs to become 
isolated and detached from their constituencies where this institutional form is crudely 
superimposed onto extant systems of corporate governance. Given the ICE corrective – and 
the recasting of national level representation – there is potential for I&C structures to become 
a key component of  a broader network of  interconnections (see Martinez Lucio and Weston 
(2000: 21-212). Researchers could usefully explore the degree of articulation and interest 
aggregation between the two institutional levels. Do ICE structures act as conduits through 
which EWC representatives cascade matters downstream as widely used in continental 
Europe (see Lecher at al. 1999)? Might ICE structures act as ‘signaling mechanisms’ 
(Marginson et al. 2004: 211) alerting European works councilors to local decisions that may 
have a transnational dimension?  Do delegates at the two levels network and share 
intelligence and a common strategy vis-à-vis the pursuit of joint interests or is this stifled by 
jurisdictional claims, competition and tensions? 
 
A closely related issue concerns the potential for ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) i.e. consistency of practice between organisational EWC and ICE systems of 
representation. At a general level of analysis, data on the operation of EWCs indicates their 
contribution to industrial relations is limited (e.g. Redfern, 2007). An important analytical 
question concerns whether such inefficiencies at pan European level are replicated within 
national (ICE) structures of consultation – a wholly plausible scenario.  
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A variety of factors might conspire to circumvent the effective operation of EWC voice at 
transnational level (see Marginson et al. 2004) e.g. a lack of cohesiveness amongst employee 
delegates and a minimalist managerial approach to the regulations, perhaps driven by (neo 
liberal) country of origin factors and so on. At national level the latter feature could again be 
a significant driver invoking a highly restrictive and minimalist interpretation of the ICE 
Regulations within British MNC subsidiaries. There are however different permutations in 
the potential patterning of voice at the two levels.  MNCs headquartered  in the ‘insider’ 
economies of continental Europe,  where there is a tradition of mandated voice - as in the 
German codetermination archetype - are more likely to provide EWC delegates with useful 
information and engage in consultation than those of British and American origin 
(Waddington 2001; see also Marginson et al. 2004:231). However, there could be an element 
of institutional ‘incoherence’ at work that restricts the potential for ‘cross national 
isomorphism’  (Ferner, 1997:26)  i.e. the ability to introduce country of origin patterns into 
host country [ICE] governance systems. The supportive predisposition towards mandated 
voice, effecting perhaps a ‘participative’ (Lecher, 2001: 57-58) EWC, could conceivably 
come up against pressures for ‘local isomorphism’ and the ‘not invented here syndrome’ 
(Kostova. 1999: 318), invoking a wholly defensive and restrictive interpretation of the ICE 
Regulations by British subsidiary management. It goes without saying there are numerous 
alternative scenarios.  National I&C arrangements might be implemented by the subsidiary  
in a manner that is isomorphic or ‘consistent’ with the democratic ideals of the parent as a 
means of gaining favorable judgments and intra organisational legitimacy (see Kostova, 
1999: 319). Future research should explore the nature of voice at the two institutional levels 
and identify the factors driving differential patterns and outcomes. 
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 A further issue concerns managerial strategy vis-à-vis the navigation of the two sets of ‘soft 
style’ (O’Hagan. 2005) regulation.  Little is known about how the pan European experience 
of the EWC directive colours attitudes towards the ICE Regulations. The EWC directive has 
been characterised as a managerial tool to consolidate strategies of control over labour 
(Weston and Martinez Lucio, 1998: 556). This function is aided by the ‘neo voluntarist’ 
(Streeck, 1994: 165) nature of the regulations which afford employers significant strategic 
choice and flexibility in terms of the precise nature of implementation.  Prior to September 
1996 so called Article 13 EWC negotiations took place ‘in the shadow of the law’ (Bercusson 
cited in Waddington, 2011b: 12). They were, in other words, exempted from the provisions of 
the EWC directive and as such the competence of the bodies was a matter for  management-
representative negotiation. Adopting this ‘voluntary’ approach allowed organisations to assert 
control over the process and ensure consultative procedures were ‘tailored to the 
circumstances of the enterprise’ (Carley and Hall, 2000:105) and consistent with extant HR 
practice (Redfern, 2007: 302-303).  Organisations eschewing the Article 13 route (open until 
1996) ran the risk of having more demanding centrally imposed ‘subsidiary requirements’ 
imposed on them by default under Article 6.  
 
This proactive approach has its counterpart under the ICE Regulations.  So called ‘pre 
existing agreements’ (PEAs) ‘allow a wide margin of flexibility concerning the structural and 
operational aspects of  I&C arrangements, such as the definition of the subject matter and the 
timing of information and consultation’ (Koukiadiki, 2010: 4). Researchers might usefully 
cross tabulate whether the use of Article 13 agreements in MNCs similarly spawned the 
cautious utilisation of PEAs.  Do managerial experiences of the EWC directive shape 
strategies towards ICE? That is, are the voluntarist clauses used defensively in both instances 
to ‘undercut’ the standards set out in the default provisions? 
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A final intriguing development in this ‘still unfinished jigsaw’ (Worker-Participation.EU: 
2014) is the impact of the European Company Statute (SE) (2004). The main purpose of the 
SE statue (EC2157/2001) is to enable companies to operate their businesses on a cross-border 
basis in Europe under the same corporate regime (Worker-Participation.EU: 2014).  The SE 
represents a potentially important building block in the Europeanization of industrial relations 
(Müller and Hoffmann 2001:87) because it provides for employee board level representation 
(EBLR). As such board level representation has been indirectly spread to countries, including 
the UK, in which such representation does not exist in the domestic corporate governance 
system (Worker-Participation.EU: 2014) opening up an additional channel for interest 
representation. Consider here, for example,  Jagodzinski et al’s (2007) discussion of Allianz,  
a German multinational financial services company, where board level representatives come 
not only from Germany but also the UK (and France).   As has been forcefully argued by the 
ETUI however – absent strong linkages to representational bodies at the workplace (e.g. ICE 
structures) EBLR could remain a ‘loose head without legs’ unable to exert any influence on 
company policies (Worker-Participation.EU: 2014). Once again researchers need to 
understand and critically evaluate the interrelationships between ex ante involvement in 
board level strategic decision making and ex post ICE (and indeed EWC) influence over 
implementation.   
 
(b) The need for international comparative research 
Our understanding of the British experience of the ICE Regulations – and the opportunities 
and challenges posed for the main stakeholders – would also benefit from a broader analysis 
of international political economy. Such an approach has long informed EWC research where 
much work has been undertaken exploring the contingencies that influence diversity in 
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practice.  Drawing inspiration from broader business system analysis (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 
2001) it is well accepted that practice will be driven (at least in part) by the interplay of 
‘country of origin’ and ‘country of location’ factors (Hall et al. 2003). As noted, research 
infers the impact of EWCs on the decision making process is less in MNCs headquartered in 
‘liberal market’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) economies when compared to their ‘co-ordinated’ 
counterparts in Western Europe (Marginson et al. 2013).  
 
Comparative international research examining the workings of the ICE directive is as yet 
undeveloped.  An obvious area of inquiry concerns the operation and embededness of the 
regulations in liberal market versus coordinated market economies in view of the clear 
differences that exist between these national business systems – specifically the organisation 
of cooperate governance (Hall and Soskice 2001). Drawing on the scrutiny of EWCs it might 
be hypothesised the ICE directive will simply beget more or less linear extensions of national 
systems of voice –– the provision of useful information and meaningful consultation is less 
evidenced in UK MNCS compared to those based in continental Europe (Waddington  cited 
in Hall et al. 2003: 77). A more intriguing, if less theoretically orthodox approach, might be 
for ICE scholars to undertake a narrower ‘within system’ (see Lamare et al. 2013) ‘varieties 
of neo liberalism’ analysis. That is, for all intents and purposes, an evaluation of the Anglo-
Irish experience. As Lamare et al. (2013) convincingly argue, host economies differ, not just 
as suggested by the varieties of capitalism approach, between types of coordination in 
capitalist economies, but also within these types.  
 
There has been significant speculation on the potential implications of  the ICE Regulations 
for the UK (e.g. Gollan and Wilkinson , 2007; Hall, 2005) and to a lesser degree Ireland (see 
e.g. Doherty 2008), but minimal comparative analysis has emerged thus far (Cullinane et al. 
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2013 and Dundon et al. 2014 remain exceptions). Conventional analysis brackets the two 
countries as exemplars of a voluntarist approach to organising the employment relationship 
(e.g. Hall et al 2011: 1). Closer scrutiny of the Anglo-Irish context, however, cautions against 
a parallel set of outcomes. Dobbins (2010: 515) draws attention to the ‘hybrid’ nature of Irish 
industrial relations, where until recently ‘permissive voluntarism’ (Dobbins, 2010:499) 
operated in tandem with a corporatist peak level partnership (Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009).   
The Irish legitimisation of collectivism and the institutionalisation of voice suggests the Irish 
context is a potentially more propitious host for the ICE Regulations than the UK where 
government hostility to trade unionism (and by implication pluralism) is more entrenched. 
 
The legitimacy enjoyed by the Irish trade union movement was reflected in the transposition 
of the ICE legislation. While within the UK the unions ‘were written out of the script’ 
(Taylor et al. 2009:32) of the standard I&C provisions it is ‘significant’ 
(www.eurofound.europa) that under the Irish legislation where a trade union represents 10 
per cent or more of the workforce the union is afforded pro rata representation rights 
(Doherty, 2008: 615). In contrast to the UK the legislation hence puts trade unions in a 
‘privileged position’ (Doherty, 2008: 617). One consequence is employers are afforded far 
less opportunity for trade union marginalisation. Taken together, such contingencies point at 
the very least towards a potentially indeterminate set of outcomes. The scope for variation 
within a broader neo liberal approach to the operationalisation of mandated consultation may 
be wider than is commonly assumed.  
 
Concluding comments 
The ICE Regulations were originally lauded as a significant development, one that had ‘the 
potential to transform the UK industrial relations environment’ (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007: 
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1145). Exactly a decade on, as the first wave of the fora so constituted move into a relatively 
mature phase, there remains a significant disjuncture between the original ‘hype’ and our 
knowledge of the dynamics of these institutions. Two sets of theoretical implications follow. 
First, the sociological modeling of ICE institutions remains severely undeveloped.  This is a 
significant theoretical shortcoming; not only does such modelling have considerable heuristic 
purchase in its own right, it is also an essential precursor for the advancement of future 
bivariate analysis e.g. the relationship between differing ICE regimes and the degree of 
employee trust in management and related organisational outcomes (e.g. performance). We 
similarly know virtually nothing about the strategic response of the trade union movement –– 
the Trojan horse/colonisation hypothesis patiently awaits empirical scrutiny. Still more 
obscure are data on the principal practitioner issue – linkages to HRM and the purported 
business value to be accrued from enlightened and knowledgeable workers.   
 
The second theoretical implication is the need to arrest the division of EWC and ICE fields of 
inquiry.   Müller and Hoffman (2001:47) have bemoaned the fact that the central components 
of the European industrial relations model are generally discussed independently of one 
another. Developing this theme it has been suggested that, researchers ‘should try to 
overcome the ontological divide between macro and micro analysis’   (Müller and Hoffman 
(2001:129). Waddington (2011b: 24) has stressed EWCs are ‘located within a multilevel web 
of institutions that is in is state of flux’ (emphasis added). Hitherto, however, linkages to the 
ICE component of this institutional network and the resultant tensions and complementaries 
have remained unexplored.  This is untenable within the context of an emergent multi-level 
governance system (Marginson and Sisson, 2004) where within MNCs both sets of 
institutions are increasingly likely to be operational. As has been argued by the ETUI,  ‘it is 
advisable to understand the pieces as part of a puzzle and to examine how they might be 
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fitted together’ (Worker-Participation.EU: 2014).  The importance of multilevel level analysis 
in MNCs has similarly been stressed by intuitionalists such as Kostova (1999) but hitherto 
scholars of both EWC and ICE structures have remained skeptical, operating within their 
respective research domains. Managerial strategy, and that of the other stakeholders for that 
matter, will be informed by experiences at both institutional levels. There is, accordingly, a 
need to build national (ICE) and pan European (EWC) analyses into explanatory models to 
further our understanding of the complexities of mandated consultation.  Comparative 
international research on the workings of the I&C provisions would help to complete the 
picture. 
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   Figure 1: ‘Active’ Modes of German Works Councils 
 
 The respected works council as regulator (in large share holding firms). The works council is 
respected as an autonomous interest representative; its focus is on interest compromise; it is 
mainly reactive rather than proactive. 
 The respected, steady works council (in firms with a high density of highly skilled workers). 
Management and works councils want to ensure that the law is practiced; the works council is 
co-operative but can also be conflictual. 
 The works council as a cooperative counterpower  (in large firms).  The works councilors are 
highly skilled; the council has a strong relationship to the union. 
 The class conflictual works council: here there is distrust on both sides, strong solidarity  
between workers, works council and union. 
 
Source: Frege, 2002: 236-237    
 
